Well, now.
The materialist view is such that Dualism is ridiculous. Dualists declare that there are two completely seperate and distinct substances. One is physical, having the qualities of space, extension, colour, shape, and so on. The other is Mind, have the qualities of thinking, feeling, willing, spirit, confirming, denying, and so forth. Each substance is clear and distinct from the other, having none of the qualities of the other. This presents the problem of Interactionalism, or how one of these substances could ever affect the other.
Now, materialists think that this is ridiculous for a few reasons, an important one is that through our physical senses, we cannot perceive this aphysical substance that is thinking. Rather, immaterial qualities become properties of matter, as opposed to existing seperately, in and of themselves.
I would very much like to contrast this point of view with that of the critics of Philosophical Idealism. Philosophical idealism is the doctrine that nothing exists, not this desk, nor computer, nor even my hands, but rather I - a thinking being, whatever that may be - perceive them, and cannot pass beyond my perceptions to prove that they exist.
What I find so remarkable within these viewpoints is that both affirm the existence of one of Dualism's substances, while simultaneously denying the existence of the other. Obviously both cannot be right. What if neither are right? That would leave us believing that both substances do, in fact, exist, or else nothing at all exists, neither matter nor a seperate substance which composes all thought. This latter is extremely unlikely, as the concept of substance is very firm in the minds of all people. And we would definately say that there is some type of substance, whatever its nature is, that causes our experiences.
*I havene't proof-read this, my apologies for any inconvenience. Credit goes to Descartes and Berkeley.
December 10, 2006
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